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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
II.

Is the Gilead state specialty license plate program government speech?
Does the program constitute viewpoint discrimination?

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................................................................i	
  
2. TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... ii
3. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. iii
4. STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................iv	
  
5. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................... v	
  
6. OPINIONS BELOW ........................................................................................................ vii	
  
7. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................... 1	
  
8. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 2	
  
9. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 4
I. THE GILEAD STATE SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATE PROGRAM IS
GOVERNMENT SPEECH, AS PROPERLY DETERMINED BY THE JOHANNS
TEST.............................................................................................................................. 4
a. The Supreme Court promulgated Johanns test, as invoked in Bredesen, is the
appropriate test for locating government speech for First Amendment purposes. . 4
b. Results under the Fourth Circuit four-factor test are indeterminate, inconsistent
and ill-suited for distinguishing categories of speech for First Amendment
purposes. .................................................................................................................. 6
c. Regardless of the test applied by the court, the messages displayed on specialty
license plates issued by the State of Gilead are most properly classified as
government speech. ................................................................................................ 8
II. THE GILEAD SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATE PROGRAM IS A MEDIUM FOR
GOVERNMENT ADVOCACY AND NOT SUBJECT TO THE FIRST
AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT OF VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY ...................... 10
III. EVEN IF FOUND TO BE SUBJECT TO VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY,
GOVERNOR WEBBER’S ACTIONS ARE A REASONABLE, CONTENT-BASED
RESTRICTION ........................................................................................................... 11
a. The license plate program has not been fully opened for public dialogue and
therefore is best classified as a nonpublic forum................................................... 11
ii

b. Gilead’s denial of Mr. Smith’s plate design constitutes a reasonable, contentbased restriction ..................................................................................................... 13
10. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 14	
  
11. PRAYER ........................................................................................................................... 16	
  
12. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................................... 16

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES

Pages

Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005) ..... 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11
Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008) .......................................... 5, 6, 7, 8
Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, No. 2:03-CV-01691, 2005 WL 2412811 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26,
2005) ......................................................................................................................................... 6, 7
Choose Life, 547 F. 3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008) ........................................................................... 13, 14	
  
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1995) ......................... 12, 13	
  
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) .................................... 13	
  
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) ..................................................... 4, 8, 11
Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) ............................ 12	
  
Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004) ..................... 5, 6, 10, 13
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) ..................................... 6, 8, 11, 15	
  
Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (2005) .......................................... 11, 13	
  
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) ........................................................................................ 11	
  
Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t. of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610 (4th
Cir. 2002) ............................................................................................................................ 5, 9, 10
CONSTITUTION
U.S. Const. amend. I ............................................................................................ 2, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12
STATUTES
42 Gil. Stat. Ann. § 1661 ........................................................................................................... 1, 9
451 Gil. Stat. Ann. § 1984 ........................................................................................................ 2, 13
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008) .......................................................................................................... 10
iv

Lilia Lim, Four-Factor Disaster: Courts Should Abandon the Circuit Test for Distinguishing
Government Speech from Private Speech, 83 WASH. L. REV. 569 (2008) ................................... 6

v

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on February 1, 2012. (R. at 33). Petitioner filed
his petition for writ of certiorari on February 1, 2012. (R. at 34). This Court granted the petition
on March 25, 2012. (R. at 36). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)(2000).
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No. 13-9100
_________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________
GREG WEBBER, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF GILEAD,
Petitioner,
v.
WINSTON SMITH,
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_________________________________________
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_________________________________________
OPINIONS BELOW
_________________________________________
The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts have not been reported.
The opinions appear in the record. (R. 25, 32).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2005, the Gilead General Assembly passed the Overwhelming Numbers for the
Eradication of Social Tyrannies for the Advancement of Total Equality (ONESTATE) Act,
intended to foster inclusion and social harmony in the State by eliminating discrimination based
on race, color, ethnicity, national origin, sex, religion or sexual orientation, under the color of
state authority. (R. at 4). A provision of the ONESTATE Act directed the Commissioner of the
Department of Motor Vehicles to issue a specialty license plate reading “Celebrate Gilead’s
Diversity.” Id.
The State of Gilead allows its citizens to affix specialty license plates to their vehicles.
To date, the State has authorized designs and messages for 74 specialty license plates, some of
which were designed by public and private organizations as diverse as the Gilead Veteran’s
Alliance, the Organization to Preserve Gilead’s Wild Spaces, Gilead State College, and Integrate
Gilead’s SOCiety (INGSOC), a pro-diversity group the State asked to help design its “Celebrate
Gilead’s Diversity” specialty plate. (R. at 3).
Under the Gilead specialty license plate program, citizens can request new designs for
state-issued specialty license plates in two ways: by petitioning the General Gilead Assembly to
create the proposed specialty license plate through legislation, or by applying for the
authorization of a new plate by the Governor. (R. at 6-7). A state statute, 42 Gil. Stat. Ann. §
1661, sets forth the application process and provides the Governor authority to alter, modify or
refuse to authorize any specialty license plate design that is contrary to state law. Id.
In 2011, Respondent, Winston Smith, filed an application to create a specialty license
plate bearing the message “White Pride Statewide” and prominently displaying the logo of a
white supremacist organization in the center of the license plate. (R. at 3-4, 13). While Mr.
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Smith’s application satisfied the minimum technical application requirements for consideration
by the State, Governor Greg Webber denied the proposed design as contrary to state law. (R. at
13). In a letter to Mr. Smith, Governor Webber informed him the refusal was based on findings
the design advocated discrimination, a message that if displayed on a State of Gilead license
plate, would be attributed to the State – conflicting with 451 Gil. Stat. Ann. § 1984, the
ONESTATE Act. Id. Governor Webber also advised Mr. Smith he was free to petition the
General Assembly for the creation of the proposed specialty license plate or a change in the
current laws. Id.
Mr. Smith brought an action challenging Governor Webber’s enforcement of 451 Gil.
Stat. Ann. § 1984, 2050. (R. at 2). Mr. Smith claims these provisions, as applied to him, violate
his rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as incorporated by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The District Court granted Mr. Smith’s motion for summary
judgment, finding the Gilead specialty license plate program constitutes a hybrid of governmentprivate speech under the Fourth Circuit’s four-factor test and that the State’s denial of his
specialty license plate design equates to impermissible viewpoint discrimination. (R. at 26, 28).
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit affirmed the District
Court decision. (R. at 33). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Gilead
specialty license plate program is government speech, and whether the denial of Mr. Smith’s
license plate design is viewpoint neutral. (R. at 36).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State of Gilead was restricted from issuing its “Celebrate Gilead’s Diversity” license
plate after it denied a proposal for a specialty plate bearing the logo of a well-known white
supremacist group and the phrase “White Pride Statewide.” This injunction directly interferes
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with the State’s ability to place reasonable content restrictions on the speech it permits in the
nonpublic forum of its specialty license plate program. Requiring Gilead to issue a license plate
with such discriminatory connotations compels the State to disseminate a message in direct
conflict with the message adopted into law by the Gilead General Assembly in furtherance of the
State’s values of inclusion and equality. The court of appeals erred in concluding the speech
contained in Gilead license plates is private speech and the State engaged in viewpoint
discrimination by denying Mr. Smith’s plate design.
The Court should find the speech contained in Gilead license plates is the State’s own
speech, and the Governor is not required to permit Smith’s design to be published. When, as
here, the government chooses its own message and controls that message from beginning to end,
it is not required to also permit contradictory messages in the same forum, in accordance with the
government-speech doctrine.
In the event the Court finds Gilead’s license plate program is subject to forum analysis, it
must recognize the State is entitled to enforce reasonable, content-based restrictions on speech.
Governor Webber’s refusal of Smith’s discriminatory design was a reasonable content-based
constraint grounded in Gilead’s interest in controlling the messages displayed on its state-owned
and issued license plates, as well as the plate’s discriminatory content and the nature of the
forum itself. In this case, Mr. Smith’s proper recourse is not in the courtroom, but at the ballot
box, as he is free to petition the General Assembly for a change in the laws or the adoption of his
message.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE GILEAD STATE SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATE PROGRAM IS
GOVERNMENT SPEECH, AS PROPERLY DETERMINED BY THE JOHANNS
TEST.
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a.

The Supreme Court promulgated Johanns test, as invoked in Bredesen, is the appropriate
test for locating government speech for First Amendment purposes.
Although there is currently a split among the Circuit Courts regarding the proper method

for determining speech attribution for First Amendment purposes, the authoritative test for
ascertaining whether the speaker is the government or a private entity is the Johanns test,
promulgated by this Court and applied by the Sixth Circuit in Bredesen. See Am. Civil Liberties
Union of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2005). In Johanns, this Court held
when the Government determines the overarching message and retains exclusive editorial
control, the speech must be attributed to the Government, and the First Amendment Free Speech
Clause has no application. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).
Government control over a message is determined using two-factors: (1) whether the government
set the message and (2) whether it approved and controlled the message. Johanns, 544 U.S. at
560-562.
Critics of the Sixth Circuit’s application of the Johanns test in Bredesen, argue the
programs examined by the two cases are not analogous. See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 385 (Martin,
J., dissenting) (arguing a private individual’s choice to pay the price for a particular specialty
license plate was not comparable to the compelled subsidy of government speech in Johanns).
As an alternative, some courts have adopted the Fourth Circuit’s four-factor test set out in Sons
of Confederate Veterans, which considers: (1) the central purpose of the program where the
speech occurs; (2) the degree of editorial control the government maintained over the speech; (3)
the identity of the “literal speaker”; (4) and who holds the “ultimate responsibility” for the
content of the speech. Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t. of Motor
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002); e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956,
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960 (9th Cir. 2008); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 787-88 (4th Cir.
2004).
Regardless of the factual differences between Johanns and Bredesen, both cases involve
programs in which both the government and private entities seem to be speaking simultaneously.
This Court adopted the Johanns test to determine in these situations what, if any, First
Amendment speech protection is appropriate. The elements examined by Johanns and the
Fourth Circuit are fundamentally the same. See Stanton, 515 F. 3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008). In
application, both tests consider who controls the speech, the purpose of the program where the
speech occurs, and to whom the speech is most readily attributed. See id. (adopting the Fourth
Circuit’s four-factor test – supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Johanns – to determine
whether messages in Arizona’s special organization license plate program were government or
private speech). However, the open-ended elements of the four-factor test lead to inconsistent
outcomes and findings of mixed government-private speech – a vague category this Court has
not recognized. See generally Lilia Lim, Four-Factor Disaster: Courts Should Abandon the
Circuit Test for Distinguishing Government Speech from Private Speech, 83 WASH. L. REV. 569,
593 (2008). The distinguishing benefit of the Johanns test is its ability to be applied as a brightline rule, returning clear, consistent determinations of whether speech should be attributed to the
government or a private entity. Therefore, the Johanns test should be invoked in this case to
determine the proper attribution of the speech on Gilead specialty license plates.
b.

Results under the Fourth Circuit four-factor test are indeterminate, inconsistent and ill
suited for distinguishing categories of speech for First Amendment purposes.
Courts employing the Fourth Circuit four-factor test have reached divergent conclusions in

classifying speech for First Amendment purposes, finding everything from government to
private, and even “mixed” speech. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S.
5

460, 472 (2009) (holding the city’s permitting placement of privately donated monuments in a
public park was government speech); Stanton, 515 F.3d at 965-68 (deciding specialty license
plate was private speech); Rose, 361 F.3d at 793-94 (message on specialty plate constituted
hybrid of government and private speech); Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, No. 2:03-CV-01691,
2005 WL 2412811, at *3-6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005) (holding specialty plates were government
speech). The elements comprising the four-factor test are too ambiguous and broad to be applied
consistently or produce any sort of predictable outcome. See Lim, Four-Factor Disaster, supra,
at 593.
Even in applying the four-factor test to the exact same set of facts, courts have reached
inconsistent and, in fact, opposite conclusions. In Arizona Life Coalition v. Stanton, the Ninth
Circuit employed the four-factor test to find all four factors indicated private speech, a complete
reversal of the district court’s finding that all four factors indicated government speech. Stanton,
515 F. 3d 956, 968. In its analysis, the district court determined since the purpose of the license
plates was to identify drivers and Arizona executed the specialty license plate program, the
program’s primary purpose was government speech. Stanton, 2005 WL 2412811, at *3-4. The
second factor, editorial control, also weighed heavily in the government’s favor, as the state
exercised control by limiting participation in the program to only those organizations meeting
certain requirements. Id. Finally, the district court combined the literal-speaker and ultimateresponsibility factors, finding Arizona’s control over the type of organizations and substance
permitted by the license plate program to indicate government speech. Id.
When the Ninth Circuit considered the same facts, it found the central purpose of the
program was to allow citizens to identify themselves with personalized messages, indicating
private speech; editorial control over the message rested with the private group, Life Coalition,
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since it proposed the message; the literal-speaker factor implicated private speech interests
because the private organization’s logo was to be displayed on the plate; and the private entity
also bore ultimate responsibility for the message because it had initiated the production of the
plate by submitting an application to the state. Stanton, 515 F.3d at 965-68. Not only did the
two courts define the elements behind the four factors completely differently, they reached
entirely opposite results in their application.
Until the elements of the four-factor test are more fully defined as to render them reliable
criteria capable of consistent application, this Court should not adopt the test as an acceptable
approach for determining speech attribution for First Amendment purposes.
c.

Regardless of the test applied by the court, the messages displayed on specialty license
plates issued by the State of Gilead are most properly classified as government speech.
Applying the authoritative Johanns test to this case demonstrates the true nature of the

Gilead license plate program is government speech. The State of Gilead controlled all aspects
the messages appearing on its specialty license plates. (R. at 6-7); see also Bredesen 441 F. 3d at
376. The Gilead General Assembly’s decision to partner with the private group INGSOC to
develop the final design of the license plate does not negate the State’s control over the specific
message. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562 (finding government speech despite the Secretary of
Agriculture allowing the members to determine the final details). Private entities can apply for
the government issuance of new specialty license plate designs two ways: by petitioning the
legislature to adopt their message, or by submitting an application for approval by the Governor.
(R. at 6-7). Both scenarios require the State to exercise its exclusive editorial powers to
authorize and control the messages, as well as their distribution on the state-owned license plates.
Id. Therefore, the issuance of a private entity’s specialty plate represents the Gilead’s adoption
of the message as its own speech. Cf. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472-473 (2009) (“It is clear that
7

the monuments in Pleasant Grove's Pioneer Park represent government speech. Although many
of the monuments were not designed or built by the City and were donated in completed form by
private entities, the City decided to accept those donations and to display them in the Park”).
Similarly, in Bredesen, the Tennessee legislature delegated partial responsibility for the
design of its “Choose Life” license plate to a private organization. Bredesen, 441 F. 3d at 376.
Despite this entrustment of its message to a private organization, the Sixth Circuit found
Tennessee reserved the power to veto the final design and therefore held the requisite control
under Johanns to find the license plate was government speech. Id. Likewise, the determinative
factor in finding the Gilead license plate program is government speech is the State’s retention of
the authority to revise or veto INGSOC’s design. (R. at 22).
Further, if this Court finds the four-factor test influential in determining the source of the
speech in Gilead’s license plate program, it should still find in favor of Governor Webb as all
four factors strongly indicate government speech. The first factor, the purpose of the specialty
license plate program, indicates government speech because the intent of the program is to
generate revenue and promote State messages. See Stanton, 515 F. 3d at 966 (finding the
primary purpose of the license plate program to be revenue generation).
The second factor, degree of editorial control, also indicates government speech, as the
processes for the issuance of a new license plate reserves to the State exclusive editorial control
over the substance of the plate. See 42 Gil. Stat. Ann. § 1661. If an individual petitions the
legislature to issue the plate, the General Assembly must adopt the message by law, leaving
exclusive approval and editorial authority to the State. Id. Alternatively, application for new
specialty plates through the Gilead Department of Motor Vehicles requires the Governor to
approve the plate design, reserving to him the right to alter or modify the content, or to refuse to
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authorize any specialty license plate that is contrary to state law. See Bredesen, 441 F. 3d at 376
(holding a group’s ability to secure a specialty plate amounts to state approval of the message).
In identifying the literal speaker, different courts have conflicting opinions about whether
the “literal speaker” is the person with whom the message originated, the entity that owns the
medium where the speech occurs, or the person conveying or displaying the speech. See, e.g.,
Rose, 361 F.3d at 794 (the vehicle owner is the literal speaker); SCV, 288 F. 3d at 621 (license
plate itself is the literal speaker). Here, the messages displayed on Gilead specialty license plates
originate both with private individuals and the State, but the State owns the license plates where
the message are displayed even after an individual selects the plate and attaches it to his car. (R.
at 6). Thus, the Gilead is literal speaker. Similarly, Gilead’s issuance of the plates, continued
ownership after the plates are attached to private vehicles, and the presence of the State’s name
on the plate leaves ultimate responsibility for the speech with the State. Cf. Bredesen, 441 F. 3d
at 377 (finding reasonable persons know license plates to be government-issued, a fortiori the
messages on the plates are understood to be government messages).
With all four factors indicating government speech, in addition to the Johanns test
demonstrating the same conclusion, the Court must find Gilead’s license plate program is not
subject to forum analysis under the First Amendment. However, in the event the Court adopts
the Fourteenth Circuit court’s finding of mixed government-public speech in this case, the
program should still be considered government speech for First Amendment purposes.
Submitting the specialty license plate program to the strict scrutiny associated with private
speech under the First Amendment threatens the legitimate purposes of the State program and
fails to recognize the State’s interest in controlling the content on state-owned license plates. See
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83
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N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 656 (2008) (arguing applying strict scrutiny under the First Amendment to
speech that is not entirely private deprives the government of its ability to control its own
messages).
II.

THE GILEAD SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATE PROGRAM IS A MEDIUM FOR
GOVERNMENT ADVOCACY AND NOT SUBJECT TO THE FIRST
AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT OF VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY.
It is well understood that when the Government speaks for itself, it is entitled to choose its

message and take appropriate steps to ensure its position is not distorted. Rosenberger v. Rector
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (2005). This discretion includes the authority to select and
promote one message while declining to endorse conflicting viewpoints on the same topic. Id.;
Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (holding the Government can, without violating
the Constitution, elect to fund a program encouraging certain activities without simultaneously
funding alternative programs that deal with the problem in a different way). Exercise of this
discretion is not subject to strict scrutiny since the Government’s decision not to disseminate
certain messages does not infringe on individuals’ First Amendment rights to free speech as
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“The Free
Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.”); see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553 (“[T]he Government's own speech ... is exempt
from First Amendment scrutiny”); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833; Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
Further, the State is entitled to exercise this autonomy in its speech even when it receives
assistance from private entities to fund or distribute its message. Summum 555 U.S. at 467-468;
see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 572 (when government controls the message, “it is not precluded
from relying on the government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from
nongovernmental sources”); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (government may regulate content of
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its speech when it enlists private entities to distribute its message); Bredesen, 441 F. 3d at 377
(reliance on citizens who voluntarily paid to display specialty license plates on their vehicles did
not preclude reliance on government-speech doctrine).
Accordingly, the government speech contained in the State of Gilead’s specialty license
plate program is not subject to strict scrutiny of forum analysis for First Amendment purposes.
III. EVEN IF FOUND TO BE SUBJECT TO VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY,
GOVERNOR WEBBER’S ACTIONS ARE A REASONABLE, CONTENT-BASED
RESTRICTION.
a.

The license plate program has not been fully opened for public dialogue and therefore is
best classified as a nonpublic forum.
The Supreme Court has identified three types of speech fora: traditional public, designated

public, and nonpublic. Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983). Speech in traditional and designated public fora is subject to strict scrutiny by the state,
and speakers can only be excluded in narrow circumstances as required to serve a compelling
state interest. Id. at 45-46 (state may enforce content-based exclusions where regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1995). Any public property traditionally devoted to public
assembly or debate is considered a traditional public forum, such as a public street or town
square. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. Alternatively, a designated public forum is created
when the government intentionally opens a nontraditional forum for public dialogue. Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 800.
All other government property that is not a public forum by tradition or design is
considered a nonpublic forum. Id. at 806. Restrictions placed on speech in a nonpublic forum
must be reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose and content-based, rather than prohibitive of a
specific viewpoint. Id. Notably, the Government is not required to allow all forms of speech on
11

property it owns and controls, nor does it create a public forum by enabling limited discourse in a
particular location. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992);
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
To determine whether government property is a public or nonpublic forum, courts must
ascertain whether the government intended to open a nontraditional forum for public discourse.
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. Factors for consideration in this analysis include: the government’s
policies and practices with regard to speech in the forum, the nature of the property where the
speech occurs, and the forum’s suitability for the expression of ideas. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
802. Here, Gilead license plates are neither a public forum by tradition, nor has the State of
Gilead designed or intended for its plates to be a public forum for the free exchange of ideas.
Gilead license plates are primarily intended to identify drivers and facilitate limited expression of
state-controlled and approved messages. See Choose Life, 547 F. 3d 853, 865-866 (7th Cir.
2008) (finding Illinois license plates constitute a nonpublic forum based on the heavily regulated
nature of the medium and extremely limited exchange of ideas therein). Thus, the Gilead
specialty license plate program is a nonpublic forum. It follows that Governor Webber is
permitted to deny Mr. Smith’s license plate based on the fact that it violates state law and is in
direct conflict with the Government’s chosen message.
b.

Gilead’s denial of Mr. Smith’s plate design constitutes a reasonable, content-based
restriction.
The Supreme Court recognizes a distinction between reasonable content-based

discrimination, permissible to preserve the purpose of the forum, and viewpoint discrimination
directed at speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-830.
Some courts have found the government has impermissibly prohibited speech based on
viewpoint in cases where the state opened dialogue on a topic and subsequently favored one
12

viewpoint on the subject over another. Compare Rose, 361 F.3d at 799 (finding impermissible
viewpoint discrimination where South Carolina authorized a “Choose Life” specialty late
without allowing a pro-choice plate), with Choose Life, 547 F. 3d at 865 (finding a reasonable
content-based restriction where Illinois prohibited all abortion-related messages on specialty
plates). This case does not involve viewpoint discrimination.
Governor Webber’s denial of Mr. Smith’s license plate is a reasonable content-based
restriction, in accordance with state law and keeping with the purpose of the forum. By adopting
451 Gil. Stat. Ann. § 1984, 2050, the State of Gilead seeks to advance total equality within its
borders. (R. at 2). The State’s message, “Celebrate Gilead’s Diversity”, as displayed on the
specialty license plate issued in accordance with the ONESTATE Act, is an inclusive message
promoting harmony among the wide variety of backgrounds, including race, color, ethnicity,
national origin, sex, religion, or sexual orientation. The State chose this message as a means of
promoting its legitimate purpose of eradicating social tyranny. Id.
The Respondent asserts the State opened public discourse on the topic of racial heritage
when it issued the “Celebrate Gilead’s Diversity” license plate and by denying Smith’s plate, the
State impermissibly prohibited expression of his viewpoint. This contention is incorrect. Mr.
Smith’s license plate design consists of the phrase “White Pride Statewide” and a logo of a fist,
commonly associated with a well-known white supremacist group. (R. at 11). The unavoidable
connotation of Mr. Smith’s license plate is blatant discrimination against minority races and
ethnicities. This not only conflicts with the State’s message of celebrating diversity among all
races and heritages equally, but by promoting an exclusive message of race as superior to all
others, it directly violates the ONESTATE Act (prohibiting discrimination under color of state
authority) and therefore conflicts with the policies set forth by the Gilead specialty license plate
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program. (R. at 10, 13). As such, the Governor was entitled to deny the issuance of Smith’s
license plate in light of the nature of the forum, as well as the plate’s discriminatory character
and inference of State approval for messages appearing on its license plates. Cf. Summum, 555
U.S. 460, 472-473 (2009) (finding monuments on government property are routinely and
reasonably interpreted as conveying a message on the government’s behalf and the city was
entitled to refuse to place a privately donated monument in a public park).
CONCLUSION
When as here, the inference of government-speech is unavoidable, the State will be viewed
as having approved, endorsed, or at minimum, tolerated, any message printed next to its name.
The promotion of an exclusive, discriminatory message and logo associated with violence
against people of minority backgrounds is unacceptable under color of Gilead’s state authority.
Compelling the State to permit such derogatory content that conflicts with its own messages and
laws would undermine the government’s legitimate interests in controlling the substance of its
own programs.
The Gilead General Assembly did not open its license plates for the promotion of
exclusive, prejudicial messages when it adopted a diversity message, nor did the State arbitrarily
deny Smith from expressing his viewpoint. Rather, Gilead chose one message of inclusion and
harmony, as it was empowered to do by the voters of the State of Gilead. Governor Webber
refused to authorize Smith’s license plate design based on the discriminatory content on the plate
and its conflict with state law – a reasonable constraint in light of the nature of the forum and the
unavoidable inference that the State endorses the messages displayed on its license plates. If Mr.
Smith would like to see his exclusive message endorsed by the State, or a change in the State’s
stance on diversity, his appropriate recourse would be through political process.
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PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner prays the Court reverse the decisions of the courts
below and find the Gilead specialty license plate program constitutes government speech in a
nonpublic forum, under which denial of Mr. Smith’s plate was a reasonable content-based
restriction.
______________________________
Meagan McKeown
Counselor for Petitioner
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